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Introduction
Modern retailing, both traditional and online, is characterized by extensive use of
price discounting. A challenge for retailers is to convey the value of discounted prices
without appearing to deceive consumers. Several authors have recently noted that
regulation in this area has increased (c.f. Sheridan; Scher; Avery ; and Chansky) and
have cautioned retailers to be cautious in the use of comparative advertising claims.
For example, Overstock.com recently lost a deceptive comparative pricing action
brought in California Superior Court, Alameda County, by a group of district
attorneys and was assessed $6.8 million in civil penalties. (People v Overstock.com,
Case No. RG10-546833.)
For many years the Federal Trade Commission and state attorneys general
challenged price advertising that used fictitious or rarely used “reference” prices, and
issued guides on the use of reference pricing. However, since the mid-1990s the FTC
and the states rarely challenged such claims. Recently, however, this gap has been
filled by private class action lawsuits and other cases challenging deceptive reference
pricing (Scher and Transky, 2014). Thus, retailers who may have become careless
regarding the appropriate use of comparative prices need to be more alert to this
emerging issue.
Comparative advertising techniques have been on academic research agendas
for many years. A summary of comparative advertising issues in a special edition of
the Journal of Public Policy and Marketing (Grewal,1998) noted that “Evidence
indicates that comparative price advertising is a powerful advertising tool, with a
strong opportunity for deception that requires careful management and monitoring.”
(p 257).
In a leading article on comparative price advertising Compeau (2004)
documented the manner in which consumers interpret alternative price discount
messages. This research examined how different semantic phrases evoked different
meanings among respondents, specifically looking at variances in consumers’
interpretations of three common phrases – “Compare At”, “MSLP” (Manufacturer’s
Suggested List Price), and “Regular Price” - and also the degree to which each phrase
evoked different meanings in different subjects. A total of 299 graduate and
undergraduate students were shown a newspaper advertisement which contained a
reference price of $59.99 and a sale price of $42.00. Three reference price phrases

(Compare At, MSLP, Regular Price) were used. Respondents, who each saw only one
version of the ad, were asked to indicate which of the following options best defined
the semantic reference phrase: The price at which the item usually or normally sellsan everyday price; The price I would have to pay for the product at most other stores;
or A fictitious price that has been inflated to show you that they are giving you a
discount.
The authors concluded that “Regular Price” was interpreted most consistently,
and that there was far less consensus for “MSLP” and “Compare At”. In addition, the
proportion of respondents who felt that a reference price was fictitious ranged from
26% to 31%. However, the authors realized the limitations of using only students as
subjects, for they also noted “Future research may want to consider a survey
methodology to tap a much broader spectrum of consumers.” (p 186). Thus, the
purpose of our research is to extend Compeau’s research to a more representative
consumer population. The main research question we sought to answer was whether
a broader range of consumers would give the same meanings to the phrases evaluated
by Compeau and his fellow authors.

Literature review
The Compeau article provided a thorough review of relevant literature up to 2004,
and we will not attempt to replicate it here.
Trifts (2013) have recently extended the work regarding the role of trust in
retailer selection by demonstrating that shoppers internalize the act of providing
competitor price information as a preliminary cue in establishing a retailer’s
trustworthiness. They concluded that their results suggest “... providing competitor
information can be a powerful tool by which retailers can influence consumer
preference by acting as a useful trust-building mechanism, especially under
conditions in which the retailer’s prices are not clearly superior to those of its
competitors”. (p 173). As in many similar studies, the subjects were undergraduate
students.
Grewal (2014) investigated the impact on perceived product quality of the
interaction of semantic cues (“Regular price” and “Compare At”), location of cue
presentation (in store or at home), product consumption goal (hedonistic or
utilitarian), motivation to process information (high or low) and companionship
(shopping alone or with a friend). They conducted three studies using student
subjects, and found that the effects of semantic cues depend on all of these
independent variables. “As predicted, we found there was a semantic cue × location
interaction when there was a utilitarian goal (but not a hedonic goal) and when there
was low motivation to process information (but not high motivation to process)……We
also find that when a consumer is shopping with a companion within store cues result
in stronger quality perceptions than between store cues. The semantic cue × location
interaction shows that when the semantic cue is encountered in an in-store setting,
within store cues resulted in higher perceived quality. When the cue is encountered
at home, between store cues resulted in higher evaluations than within store cues…”
(p 202-203).

While Grewal (2012) is not directly relevant to understanding the meaning of
the semantic cues as opposed to their impact on quality perceptions, we see this work
as reinforcing the need for a studies with more representative subjects. For example,
it is unlikely that most students, especially undergraduates, have undergone the
changes in buying behavior brought about by the events of recent years. Perhaps the
most important recent influencer of consumer price sensitivity has been the “Great
Recession”, which has caused consumers to be more price conscious and has
motivated retailers to find ways to promise buyers the best value. Yet most
undergraduates had little purchasing power or involvement in the marketing system
during that period. In addition, technological developments now allow consumers to
conduct their own price comparisons through the use of bots, price comparison
websites, etc. to a much greater degree (Grewal, 2012).
Today, these issues are more important than ever. It is true that the FTC has
not been active in this area in recent years, and that consumers have no private right
of action under the FTC Act – that is, no right based on the act to file civil suits for
deceptive price advertising. However, actions under state statutes are on the rise,
especially in California. District attorneys and plaintiffs’ class action lawyers there
have challenged pricing practices at a variety of retailers including Overstock.com
(“compare at” and “compare” pricing), Macy’s/Bloomingdales (“compare at” pricing),
Burlington Coat Factory (“compare” pricing), J. Crew (“valued at” pricing), T. J. Maxx
(“compare at” pricing), Nordstrom Rack (“compare at” pricing), and Kohl’s (“regular”
or “original” pricing). Some cases have been dismissed, including an action against
Neiman Marcus, but others have been more successful. The case against
Overstock.com was resolved with a $6.8 million civil penalty, which is under appeal,
and a New York case against Michael Kors (USA), Inc. over MSRP pricing was settled
for $4.9 million in 2015. A California class action against J.C. Penny (aimed at false
sale advertising) was settled for a payment of up to $50 million.
California is a particularly popular forum for the suits because of the proconsumer language found in the California Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), the
California Unfair Competition Law (UCL), and the California False Advertising Law
(FAL). In addition, it is comparatively easy for California consumers to establish legal
standing under these statutes. Under the UCL and FAL consumers need not show
that they paid more than their purchases were worth or that they lost property or
money; it is enough to allege that they would not have made the purchase but for the
misrepresentation. Hinojos v. Kohl’s, 718 F. 3d 1098 (Ninth Circuit, 2013). Under the
CLRA consumers can sue provided that they suffered any damage, which includes
opportunity costs, transaction costs and minor pecuniary damage. Meyer v. Sprint
Spectrum, 200 P.3d 295, 299 (California Supreme Court, 2009).
Furthermore, the FTC could choose to step up its involvement in this area. In
2014, four members of Congress, concerned about some outlet stores’ practice of
selling lower quality goods made specifically for outlets, wrote FTC Chair Edith
Ramirez asking the Commission to “use its authority to investigate deceptive and
unfair marketing practices at outlet stores and punish offenders.” The FTC is

already scheduled to review its Guides against Deceptive Pricing in 2017 (deferred
from 2012).

Method
Three versions of a simple advertisement for a fictitious department store sale which
advertised a wool sweater at a price of $24.99 were developed. The non-sale price was
shown as $49.99 using one of the following three phrases:
 “Compare At” (i.e. “Compare at $49.99”)
 “MSLP” Manufacturer’s Suggested List Price (MSLP), sometimes referred to
as Manufacturer’s Suggested Retail Price1
 “Regular price”
Respondents saw only one of the phrases. They were then asked the following
question:

Which of the three best describes the meaning of (compare at/ MSLP/regular price)?
a. The price at which the item usually or normally sells - an everyday price
b. The price I would have to pay for the product at most other stores
c. A fictitious price that has been inflated to show you that they are giving you
a
discount
In addition, half of each group of respondents was offered the choice of
“Other/no opinion”, which was not offered in the Compeau study. This was done to
test whether the list of possible meanings was comprehensive enough to meet the
definitional needs of all respondents.
An online consumer panel operated by Harris Interactive, a division of Nielsen,
one of the industry leaders in consumer panel management (Hair et al, 2010) was
used to collect data. The questions and materials used in this experiment were
embedded in a twenty-minute average administration time financial services
tracking survey administered to residents of the Rochester, NY Metropolitan
Statistical Area. These questions appeared near the end of a questionnaire that
focused more generally on respondents’ perceptions of certain financial services
products (e.g. deposit, investment, and loan accounts). The survey also solicited
demographic information from the respondents. The only survey qualifier other than
geographic location was age (18 or older). As is common in panel studies, respondents
were not aware of the study’s sponsor. Quality control procedures (such as embedded
quality control questions and post-survey subjective analysis) were used to eliminate
questionable survey responses. Post-fielding quality control measures reduced the
number of usable completions to 601 from an initial 624. Survey participants
represented a wide variety of demographics (see Table 1).

1

“sometimes referred to as Manufacturer’s Suggested Retail Price” added to original definition

Results
Table 2 on the following page shows the respondents’ interpretations of the
comparative price phrases and the impact of adding an “Other/no opinion”. There
was almost no use of the
Table 1

Selected demographic comparisons (age 18+)
Online panel

Rochester MSA

US Population

33.1%

48.6%

49.2%

67.9%

51.4%

50.8%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

18-34

21.1%

33.2%

26.9%

35-44

10.5%

13.5%

17.1%

45-54

16.4%

17.5%

18.9%

55-64

25.8%

16.5%

16.8%

65+

26.2%

19.3%

20.4%

Total

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

High school grad or less

18.7%

38.0%

42.0%

Some college/Associates

36.2%

29.5%

28.8%

Four year degree

21.5%

18.2%

18.9%

Some grad school/degree

23.6%

14.2%

10.4%

Total

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Gender
Men

total
Age

Education

Other/no opinion option, except when it came to “Regular price” where 8.4% of
respondents chose it. The differences in responses were not statistically significant at
the .05 or better level of confidence except with respect to “Regular price”...2
Table 3 provides the direct comparison with the Compeau results.
The table shows a full distribution of results and the chi-square test is for the full distribution
with “0” used for the NA cell when “no opinion” was not offered. We also tested the significance using
Fishers exact test with a 2 x 2 format (combining all of the non-No Opinion values together) and
found a similar result to the full table.
2

Statistically significant differences (p=.002) were found for MSLP where far more
of the current study’s respondents chose “The price at which the item usually or
normally sells - an everyday price” and far fewer “A fictitious price that has been
inflated to show you that they are giving you a discount”. The difference in
interpretation of “Compare At” was also significant - far more chose “The price I
would have to pay for the product at most other stores” than in the Compeau study.

Table 2 Interpretation of comparative price phrases
Comparative price
phrase

“Regular price”

“MSLP”

“No opinion” No opinion” “No opinion”
not offered offered as a not offered as
as a choice
choice
a choice
(original
(original
study)
study)
Respondent belief
The price at which the
item usually or
normally sells - an
everyday price
The price I would have
to pay for the product at
most other stores
A fictitious price that
has been inflated to
show you that they are
giving you a discount
No Opinion/Other
Total
Count
Chi square

“Compare at”

No opinion” “No opinion”
offered as a not offered as a
choice
choice
(original study)

No opinion”
offered as a
choice

77.1%

69.5%

46.5%

37.9%

35.7%

25.7%

4.8%

4.2%

11.1%

10.7%

41.8%

50.5%

18.1%

17.9%

42.4%

46.6%

22.4%

22.8%

NA

8.4%

NA

0%

NA

1.0%

100.0%
100.0%
95
105
9.276; p = .026

100.0%
100.0%
99
103
5.900; p = .117

100.0%
100.0%
101
98
3.393; p = .335

Discussion
It is instructive to see such a low percentage of “Other/no opinion” responses when
that choice was offered. This supports the three dimensions of the Compeau study:
an everyday price; a price at another store; or a false price that is intended to convey
a discount.3
Nevertheless, there may be other nuances not captured by the three semantic
phrases because respondents felt that the ones offered were “close enough”. While
Grewal 2014 refers to within-store cues (comparing the sale price to another price offered by the
same store) and between store cues (comparisons to prices of other stores)
3

Compeau conducted qualitative research with further women shoppers, apparently
after the data was collected for the quantitative study, we also asked respondents to
give an explanation of the sale price reference term they were exposed to during the
data collection and prior to seeing the phrase used in the advertisement. While the
analysis of those responses is still in progress, our preliminary assessment suggests
there may indeed be other meaningful semantic meanings besides the three choices
presented.
Table 3 Comparison with Compeau study
Comparative price
phrase

Respondent belief
The price at which the
item usually or
normally sells - an
everyday price
The price I would have
to pay for the product at
most other stores
A fictitious price that
has been inflated to
show you that they are
giving you a discount
Total
Count
Chi square

“Regular price”

“MSLP”

“Compare at”

This study

Compeau

This study

Compeau

This study

Compeau

77.1%

70.0%

46.5%

48.0%

35.7%

50.0%

4.8%

2.0%

11.1%

28.0%

41.8%

16.0%

18.1%

28.0%

42.4%

24.0%

22.4%

34.0%

100.0%
100.0%
95
99
3.796; P = .149

100.0%
100.0%
99
108
12.569; P= .002

100.0%
100.0%
101
92
14.919; P=.001

That “regular price” is the only semantic phrase garnering a relatively large
number of “Other/no opinion” responses is puzzling for it suggests that this
reference term is more ambiguous than the others. However, as later discussed,
“Regular price” had the least dispersed choices (i.e. had the highest percentage
centered on one interpretation). We note that the frequency of “Other/no opinion”
responses (8.4%) is almost exactly the difference in outcomes between the 77.1% of
respondents choosing the explanation of normal price (77.1%) when “Other/no
opinion” was not an available choice and the percentage choosing normal price
(69.5%) when “Other/no opinion” was offered (a difference of 7.6%). However, until
further analysis is complete, we cannot suggest a plausible explanation.
The differences between our findings and the benchmark Compeau study with
regard to semantic meanings are highly interesting. They were smallest in the use of
“Regular Price” where the large majority of respondents viewed its meaning in a
consistent manner in both studies. However, our study indicated that responses were

even more homogeneous than Compeau around the normal price explanation. These
differences
were
statistically
significant
at
p<.15.
Much stronger differences were obtained for the other semantic phrases. Our
respondents were much more likely to perceive “MSLP” to be a fictitious price and
less likely to perceive it as a price to be paid at other stores, although the modal
meaning of both studies was the same (normal price). The higher percentage of
fictitious price interpretations suggests less misunderstanding among potential
buyers and therefore less impact, and less vulnerability to
deceptive practices claims, as the phrase would be less likely to influence actual
behavior.
For “Compare At” there were even larger differences in responses between the
subjects in the Compeau and our subjects (p=.001). Ours were much more likely to
perceive this phrase to denote what most other stores would charge. The ambiguity
is even more pronounced, since the net result is that our distribution is more widely
spread over the three choices.
Thus, our study shows “MSLP” to be less ambiguous than “Compare At,” while
Compeau found the opposite.

Conclusions
This study both affirms and extends the benchmark of Compeau. While we found
statistically significant differences between their results and ours when using a
sample more representative of the adult population per their suggestion, we
nevertheless agree that the use of any of these phrases, especially “MSLP” and
“Compare At” can be problematic due to variations in semantic meaning. These
variations can be interpreted as evidencing inaccurate information that influences
purchasing behavior in a manner which reduces the perceived value to the consumer.
Retailers should find this information useful when choosing comparative
advertising terms. In both studies, “Regular price” seems to be the least deceptive in
the sense that it has a more common meaning than other terms. Retailers should
consider using this term for both within store and between store comparisons.
Modifiers could be added to make the meaning even clearer. For example, sale prices
could be expressed as “Regular price in this store” or “Regular price at (store name or
type)” for a within store expression. “Regular price at other stores” could be used for
a comparison to prices at other stores. However, the downside to the use of Regular Price is
that the percent who see it as “a fictitious price” is low, suggesting a higher proportion of
potentially deceived consumers!
References
Avery, R., Cawley, J., Eisenberg, M., and Cantor, J. (2013) Raising Red Flags: The
Change in Deceptive Advertising of Weight Loss Products After the Federal Trade
Commission’s 2003 Red Flag Initiative, Journal of Public Policy and Marketing, Vol.

32 (1) Spring, pp. 129-139

Branca v. Nordstrom, Inc., (S.D. Cal.) No. 14CV2062
California Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) (1970)
http://thelemonlawcalifornia.com/consumer-law-legal-resources/consumers-legalremedies-act/

California Unfair Competition Law (UCL) (1977)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/California_Unfair_Competition_Law

California False Advertising Law (FAL) (2004).

http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgibin/displaycode?section=bpc&group=17001-18000&file=17500-17509

Chester v. The TJX Companies, Inc., (C.D. Cal.) No. 5:15-CV-01437
Chowning v. Kohl’s Department Stores, Inc. (S.D. Cal.) No. 15CV1624
Compeau, L., Grewal, D., Chandrashekarn, L. (2002) Comparative Price Advertising:
Believe It or Not, The Journal of Consumer Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 2
Compeau, L., Lindsey-Mullikin, J., Grewal, D., and Petty, R. (2004)
Consumers’ Interpretations of the Sematic Phrases Found in Reference Price
Advertisements, The Journal of Consumer Affairs, Vol. 38, No. 1

D’Aversa v. J. Crew Group, Inc. (S.D. N.Y.) No. 1-16-CV-01590
Federal Trade Commission (April 6, 2012), FTC Announces Schedule for Reviewing
Regulations (2012), FTC Press Release
Garrison, L., Hastak, M., Hogarth, J., Kleimann, S. and Levy, A. (2013) Designing
Evidence-based Disclosures: A Case Study of Financial Privacy Notices, Journal of
Consumer
Affairs,
46.2
Summer,
p.
204
Grewal, D., Roggeveen, A., Compeau, L., Levy, M., New Times (1998) New
Technologies, New Consumers Journal of Retailing, suppl. Pricing in a Global
Marketplace 88.1 (March 2012) 1-6. Marketing, Vol. 62, No. 2 (Apr), pp. 46-59

Hinojos

v.

Kohl’s

(2013),

718

F.

3d

1098

(Ninth

Circuit).

Grewal, D., Monroe K.B., and Krishnan, R., (1998) The Effects of Price-Comparison
Advertising on Buyers' Perceptions of Acquisition Value, Transaction Value, and
Behavioral Intentions. Journal of Marketing, Vol. 62, No. 2 (Apr.), pp. 46-59

Grewal, D., Roggeveen, A, Lindsey-Mullikin, J., (2014) The Contingent Effects of
Semantic Price Cues, The Journal of Retailing 90 (2), pp. 198-205

Gattinella v. Michael Kors (USA), Inc. (S.D. N.Y.) No. 1:14-CV-05731
Haley v. Macy’s, Inc. (N.D. Cal.) No. 4:15-CV-06033
Kopalle, P., Kannan, P., Boldt, L., and Arora, N. Pechman, C. (1996) Do Consumers
Overgeneralize One-sided Comparative Price Claims, and Are More Stringent
Regulations Needed? Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. XXXIII (May), pp. 150-162

Meyer v. Sprint Spectrum (2009), 200 P.3d 295, 299 California Supreme Court.
Pechman, C. and Silk, T. (2013), Policy and Research Related to Consumer Rebates:
A Comprehensive View, Journal of Public Policy and Marketing, Vol. 32 (2) (Fall), pp.
255-270

People of the State of California v. Overstock.Com, Inc., (Superior Court of the State
of California, Alameda County) No. RG10-546833, (February 5, 2014)

Price v. Burlington Coat Factory of California LLC (C.D. Cal.) No.2:15-CV-05005
Rubenstein v. The Neiman Marcus Group, LLC (Superior Court of the State of
California, Los Angeles County) No. BC555010
Scher, I, and Chansky, E. Price (2014) Advertising Claims Make a Comeback – As
Class Actions, Greenberg Taurig Advertising, Marketing, and Promotion Law
Advisory, (September 5)
Sheridan, S., (2015) Let the Buyer and Retailer Beware of Pricing Practices
Law360,http://www.law360.com/articles/642063/let-the-buyer-and-retailer-bewareof-pricing-practices, (April 15)
Trifts, V., Huang, L., and Haubl, G. (2013) Price vs. Nice? How Unfavorable Price
Comparisons Help Retain Customers, Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice, 21.2
(Spring), pp. 163-178

Keywords: price advertising, price discounts, reference prices, comparative prices,

price

law

Relevance to Marketing Educators, Researchers and Practitioners: This paper is
useful especially to practitioners seeking to avoid accusations of deceptive pricing.
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